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SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO HAVE A MORE DETAILED DECLARATION. HE ALSO GAVE THE FIRST PUBLIC EXPLANATION OF HOW THE 1982 SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR INSPECTION QUOTAS WOULD WORK FOR STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. ISSRAELYAN MADE CLEAR THAT SOVIETS DO NOT WISH TO DISCUSS ISSUES RELATED TO CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE CD PLENARY ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 18, 1983 SOVIET REP (AMB. ISSRAELYAN) DELIVERED A STATEMENT CONTAINING HIS DELEGATION'S ASSESSMENT OF THE WORK ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) BAN. THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS WERE: OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE 1983 SESSION THE U.S. BINARY CW PROGRAM, STOCKPILE-RELATED ISSUES, (CONTENT OF THE INITIAL STOCKPILE DECLARATION, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF STOCKS BEFORE DESTRUCTION, INSPECTION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION), CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES, NON-PRODUCTION OF CW IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR BINARY CW, AND CD WORK METHODS. SOVIET VIEWS ON THESE TOPICS ARE OUTLINED BELOW.

4. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE 1983 SESSION

IN THE SOVIET VIEW A KEY DEVELOPMENT IS THAT THE CD MANAGED TO GO BEYOND GENERAL DEBATES AND TO START PREPARATION AND CONSIDERATION OF PROVISIONS FOR A FUTURE CONVENTION. THIS WORK SHOULD BE CONTINUED. ISSRAELYAN PRAISED THE CONTACT GROUP COORDINATORS  
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PAGE 03 GENEVA 07785 01 OF 04 231713Z

AND THE CW WORKING GROUP CHAIRMAN (AMB. MCPHAIL/CANADA). WHILE THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMER SESSION WERE POSITIVE, THEY WERE CONSIDERABLY LOWER THAN SOVIET EXPECTATIONS, HOWEVER. THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO THE "QUITE UNFAVORABLE SITUATION IN THE WORLD IN GENERAL," AND ALSO TO U.S. REFUSAL TO DRAFT TREATY TEXT, DEPARTURE FROM POINTS AGREED IN THE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS, AND THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM.

5. U.S. BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

A. ISSRAELYAN POINTED SPECIFICALLY TO SENATE APPROVAL OF BINARY CW PRODUCTION AS A REASON FOR THE UNPRODUCTIVENESS OF THE SUMMER SESSION. HE REFERRED TO STATEMENTS ABOUT PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET

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UNION, REFERRED TO THE "INDIVISIBLE" NATURE OF PEACE, AND POINTED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET RESPONSE. IN THE SOVIET VIEW THE SENATE ACTION IS MORE EVIDENCE THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO KEEP A FREE HAND TO BUILD UP ITS CHEMICAL ARSENAL, DECLARATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS NOTWITHSTANDING.

B. IN A CRITICAL REFERENCE TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, ISSRAELYAN SAID: QUOTE:

BUT CANNOT THE VERY DELICATE THREAD OF LONG PATIENCE AT THE TALKS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN BE BROKEN IN THE LIGHT OF SUCH FACTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE U.S. VICE-PRESIDENT ADVOCATED HERE AT THE COMMITTEE THE SPEEDING UP OF THE TALKS IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT CREATED BY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND A FEW MONTHS LATER GAVE A DECISIVE VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME WHICH KILLS THESE TALKS?

END QUOTE.

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6. STOCKPILE-RELATED ISSUES

A. ACCORDING TO ISSRAELYAN, A KEY ISSUE AT THIS STAGE IS ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENT ON THE ENTIRE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 07785 02 OF 04 231714Z

RANGE OF PROBLEMS RELATED TO STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. THE PRECONDITIONS EXIST TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS.

B. STOCKPILE DECLARATION. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF NON-ALIGNED DELS AND OTHERS, THE SOVIET UNION "PROPOSES" THAT THE INITIAL STOCKPILE DECLARATION INCLUDE THE NAMES OF THE CHEMICALS AND THE TYPES, CALIBRES, AND NUMBER OF FILLED MUNITIONS. " (FOR EXAMPLE, ARTILLERY MUNITIONS, 155 MM, FILLED WITH SARIN-1,000 PIECES)." IN THE SOVIET VIEW THIS SHOULD MAKE POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE CONTENT OF THE VARIOUS DECLARATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION PROCESS.

(COMMENT: THIS SOVIET CONCESSION APPEARS TO RESOLVE SEVERAL LONG-STANDING ISSUES ON THE DECLARATION OF THE CONTENT OF STOCKPILES. AS NOTED SUBPARA C BELOW, HOWEVER, THE DECLARATION

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OF LOCATIONS IS STILL UNRESOLVED. THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH REGARD TO CONTENT OF STOCKS IS REFLECTED IN THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT FROM THE CW WORKING GROUP REPORT:

(THERE SHOULD BE) AN UNDERTAKING TO SUBMIT TO THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AN INITIAL DECLARATION ... NOT LATER THAN 30 DAYS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OR ADHERENCE TO THE CONVENTION ... STATING THE COMPOSITION OF ALL STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALL CHEMICALS, INCLUDING PRECURSORS, SHOULD BE DECLARED BY THEIR CHEMICAL NAMES, TOXICITIES WHERE APPLICABLE, AND WEIGHTS IN METRIC TONS IN BULK AND FILLED INTO MUNITIONS. MUNITIONS SHOULD BE DECLARED BY TYPES, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 07785 02 OF 04 231714Z

CALIBRES, QUANTITIES, AND CHEMICAL FILL. DEVICES AND "SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED" EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DECLARED,

(FOLLOWING POINTS ARE NOT AGREED)

BY TYPE AND QUANTITY, AND FOR DEVICES, ALSO BY SIZE AND CHEMICAL FILL, DECLARATION OF LOCATIONS OF ALL STOCKPILES AND COMPOSITION OF THE STOCKS AT EACH LOCATION.

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C. STOCKPILE MONITORING. PROPOSALS FOR DECLARATION OF STOCKPILE LOCATIONS ARE "PURELY UNILATERAL AND UNREALISTIC," DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT "POSSIBLE UNIVERSITY OF THE STORAGES WHERE CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE KEPT, AND MAY AFFECT THE DEFENSE INTERESTS" NOT RELATED TO CW. (COMMENT: IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION SOVIET OFFICIAL POINTED TO THE "POSSIBILITY" THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS COULD BE STORED AT THE SAME LOCATION AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. END COMMENT) THE SOVIET UNION "PROPOSES" THAT, TO PROVIDE RELIABLE VERIFICATION, STOCKPILE VERIFICATION STORAGE SITES COULD BE CREATED AT STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION SITES. THE LOCATIONS OF THESE SPECIAL STORAGE SITES AND THE DESTRUCTION FACILITIES WOULD BOTH BE DECLARED AT THE SAME TIME. FURTHERMORE, "AT SUCH STORAGE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION ON THE BASIS OF QUOTA WOULD BE PERMITTED DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE DECLARED STOCKS."

(COMMENT: THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT

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WHAT STOCKS WOULD ACTUALLY BE LOCATED AT THESE  
SPECIAL STORAGE SITES. AN INITIAL PRIVATE RESPONSE  
WAS THAT THE SITES WOULD CONTAIN ONLY THE STOCKS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, CDG, UR  
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): SOVIET

TO BE DESTROYED" IN THE NEXT STAGE". THIS EXPLANATION WAS RETRACTED, HOWEVER, AFTER DISCUSSION WITHIN THE SOVIET DELEGATION. IN ANY CASE, THEY HAVE NOW OPENED UP THE SUBJECT OF STOCKPILE MONITORING TO BROAD DISCUSSION BY PUTTING A PROPOSAL OF THEIR OWN ON THE TABLE. HERETOFORE IT HAS BEEN ONLY A U.S.-PAKISTANI  
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 07785 03 OF 04 231715Z

SUBJECT ALTHOUGH EGYPTIAN DEL HAS ALSO GIVEN STRONG SUPPORT RECENTLY. END COMMENT)

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D. ISSRAELYAN REITERATED SUPPORT FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION ON A QUOTA BASIS FOR STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. THE LEVEL OF THE QUOTA, WHICH WOULD BE THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS AT A GIVEN FACILITY EACH YEAR, COULD BE DETERMINED BY THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE USING AGREED CRITERIA. THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT: THE QUANTITY OF STOCKS, THEIR TOXICITY AND DANGER, THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THE FACILITY, THE LEVEL OF AUTOMATION AND SOME OTHER FACTORS. ISSRAELYAN STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PROPOSING ANY DEFINITIVE SOLUTION BECAUSE JOINT EFFORTS ARE BETTER. HE APPEALED FOR U.S. FLEXIBILITY AND ARGUED THAT PERMANENT PRESENCE OF INSPECTORS IS NOT NEEDED FOR STOCKS WHICH ARE NOT MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT (THAT IS, SMALL IN QUANTITY AND EITHER OBSOLETE OR LOW IN TOXICITY.)

(COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED ANY PUBLIC EXPLANATION OF HOW THEIR QUOTA SYSTEM FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION WOULD WORK, ALTHOUGH THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE MORE THAN A YEAR AGO. THE EXPLANATION IS VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT THEY HAVE SAID IN PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS SINCE MARCH 1983, BUT LESS DETAILED. END COMMENT)

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7. CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. ISSRAELYAN REPEATED LONG-STANDING SOVIET VIEWS ON THE TIMING FOR DECLARATION OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. HE SAID THESE VIEWS TOOK INTO ACCOUNT  
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PAGE 03 GENEVA 07785 03 OF 04 231715Z

"POSSIBLE UNIVERSALITY" OF SOME CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND "THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT AFFECTING THE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS OF THE STATES PARTIES", AS WELL AS "A NUMBER OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS" WHICH HE WILL SPEAK ABOUT "LATER".

B. IN THE SOVIETVIEW, A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION ON TIMING FOR DECLARATION OF LOCATIONS AND FOR THE BEGINNING OF DESTRUCTION COULD BE FOUND "AT THE LATER STAGE OF THE TALKS", TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED ON VERIFICATION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, PERMITTED PRODUCTION OF SUPERTOXIC CHEMICALS, AND NONPRODUCTION OF BINARY COMPONENTS AT COMMERCIAL PLANTS. ISSRAELYAN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE THREE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE LATTER ONE.

(COMMENT: ISSUE OF CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE MOST SENSITIVE ONE FOR THE SOVIETS. WHILE IT HAS BEEN CLEAR THEY DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS IT NOW, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THEY HAVE SAID SO EXPLICITLY. END COMMENT)

8. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR BINARY CW  
A. ISSRAELYAN REITERATED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE GDR PROPOSAL THAT BINARY CW FACILITIES BE ELIMINATED FIRST AND PROPOSED THAT THIS BEGIN WITHIN SIX MONTHS, AND BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO YEARS, AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE. THE CLOSING DOWN OF THESE FACILITIES, THE MAINTENANCE OF THEIR STATE OF NON-PRODUCTION, AND THEIR ELIMINATION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH "APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION."

B. ALSO, DESTRUCTION OF BINARY CW STOCKS SHOULD START NOT LATER THAN SIX MONTHS AND BE COMPLETED NOT LATER

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THAN TWO YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE.

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9. WORK METHODS

ACCORDING TO ISSRAELYAN, ONLY TWO-THREE MONTHS A YEAR  
ARE ACTUALLY SPENT IN CD WORK ON A CW BAN, THE REST  
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PAGE 02

GENEVA 07785 04 OF 04 231715Z

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OF THE TIME IS CONSUMED BY BREAKS. CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO HOW TO WORK MORE INTENSIVELY.

(COMMENT: ISSRAELYAN HAS A LEGITIMATE POINT HERE. ONE WOULD BE HARD-PRESSED TO INVENT LESS EFFICIENT WORK METHODS. WHILE MORE EFFICIENT METHODS WOULD HELP, SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACT MORE SERIOUSLY WOULD HELP EVEN MORE. END COMMENT)

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10. COMMENT.

A. EXCEPT FOR THE TIRADE AGAINST THE U.S. BINARY PROGRAM AT THE BEGINNING, THE STATEMENT WAS RESTRAINED IN TONE.

B. NEW ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET POSITION APPEAR TO BE:

-- WILLINGNESS TO DECLARE STOCKPILES IN TERMS OF CHEMICAL NAMES, RATHER THAN BY TOXICITY CATEGORIES.

-- WILLINGNESSTO DECLARE MUNITIONS BY TYPE, SIZE, FILL, AND QUANTITY, RATHER THAN BY QUANTITY OF AGGREGATE QUANTITY OF CHEMICAL CONTAINED BY TOXICITY CATEGORY.

-- A PROPOSAL FOR CREATION OF STOCKPILE STORAGE SITES AT STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION FACILITIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION OF THESE STORAGE SITES ON A QUOTA BASIS.

-- A PROPOSAL FOR "APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION" OF THE CLOSING, CONTINUING INACTIVITY, AND ELIMINATION OF BINARY CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES.

-- A PROPOSAL THAT DESTRUCTION OF BINARY CW STOCKS BE-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 07785 04 OF 04 231715Z

GIN WITHIN SIX MONTHS, AND BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO YEARS, OF ENTRY INTO FORCE.

C. THESE APPARENT CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION DO NOT RESOLVE ANY OF THE BASIC ISSUES. THEY MAY PROVE TO REPRESENT VERY MODEST STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT CONSIDERABLE FURTHER EXPLORATION IS REQUIRED.

D. SOVIET SHIFT ON DECLARATION OF STOCKS HAS LEFT THE FRENCH WONDERING WHAT TO DO. THEY HAD QUIETLY BEEN

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HIDING BEHIND THE PREVIOUS SOVIET OPPOSITION TO  
DECLARATION OF CHEMICAL NAMES.

E. WE PLAN TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY TO SOVIET CRITICISM  
OF THE BINARY PROGRAM AND THE U.S. APPROACH IN OUR  
PLENARY STATEMENT ON AUGUST 23.

END COMMENT.

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